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TRUSTING THE PUBLIC: RESHAPING 
COLORADO WATER LAW IN THE FACE  
OF CHANGING PUBLIC VALUES 
Lisa Greenberg* 
Abstract: Water is a precious resource. Throughout Colorado, water has 
historically been allocated according to the rule of prior appropriation, 
where the principal method of allocation is “first in time, first in right.” As 
Colorado changes over time, the rule’s inflexible application has resulted 
in economically inefficient and environmentally detrimental conse-
quences. This is exemplified in the unreliable water distribution of the 
Windy Gap Project, and the projected detrimental environmental conse-
quences of the Windy Gap Firming Project. Thus, Colorado water law 
must change to protect the overuse and misuse of such a scarce resource. 
Despite explicit renunciation of both the public trust and public interest 
doctrines, Colorado water law must evolve to incorporate the protective 
values and ideals inherent in those principles. To do so, Colorado should 
create a public interest system that outlines specific values of importance 
to the community. Then, the state should use those values to establish a 
comprehensive public trust that can be integrated with the current prior 
appropriation system. 
In an age when man . . . is blind even to his most essential needs for sur-




 When you turn on the tap, or the shower, or the washing machine, 
out comes water. For many people, there is no consideration about 
where the water comes from or how much they can use. Unfortunately, 
the abundance of water is a major misconception.2 In the near future, 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles and Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2012–2013. 
1 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring 39 (40th anniversary ed. 2002). 
2 See Where Is Earth’s Water Located?, U.S. Geological Surv., http://ga.water.usgs.gov/ 
edu/earthwherewater.html (last modified Oct. 31, 2012). 
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water will likely become a highly sought after and fought over resource.3 
One author even argues that while the wars of the 20th century were 
fought over oil, the wars of the 21st century will be fought over water.4 
 In the barren American Southwest, communities thrive on the wa-
ter from the Colorado River and its tributaries.5 The thirteen hundred 
mile long river winds through Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Ari-
zona, Utah, Nevada, and California, seven of the driest states in the 
country.6 A network of dams, aqueducts, reservoirs, and pumping sta-
tions tame the river, diverting the water to its intended use.7 Recent 
high levels of water consumption, population growth, and drought, 
however, have strained the Colorado River’s water supply.8 Already, 
demand for water among communities along the Colorado River ex-
ceeds the water supply.9 For the last decade, upstream communities 
                                                                                                                      
3 Sandra Postel, The Looming Water Wars: Farms vs. Cities, USA Today: The Magazine of 
the American Scene, Mar. 2000, at 32–34; Pam Benson, U.S. Security at Risk over Water, 
CNN.com (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/22/u-s-secur- 
ity-at-risk-over-water/?hpt=hp_t3; Will the Next War Be Fought over Water?, NPR ( Jan. 3, 2010, 
3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122195532. 
4 Will the Next War Be Fought over Water?, supra note 3. 
5 Megan Hennessy, Comment, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 
71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1661, 1661 (2004). See generally Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 1–10 (1966) (describing the Colorado River). 
6 Hennessy, supra note 5; Earth Sys. Research Lab., Total Precipitation in Inches by Month 
for Climate Divisions, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/ 
psd/data/usclimdivs/pcp.state.19712000.climo.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (showing 
that each of the seven states mentioned is among the top twelve driest states in the United 
States). Twelve hundred miles of the river are in the United States and one hundred miles 
are in Mexico. Meyers, supra note 5, at 10. Over thirty million people depend on water 
from the Colorado River, including those in Denver, Albuquerque, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, 
Las Vegas, San Diego, and Los Angeles. Robert Glennon, Water Follies: Groundwater 
Pumping and the Fate of America’s Fresh Waters 21 (2002) (pointing out that “[w]e 
literally move water uphill to wealth and power”); Joe Gertner, The Future Is Drying up, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/magazine/21water-t.html?_r= 
1&scp=1&sq=&st=nyt. Division of the Colorado River’s waters among the states is governed 
by the Colorado River Compact. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-61-101 (2011). 
7 See Robert W. Adler, Restoring Colorado River Ecosystems: A Troubled Sense 
of Immensity 4 (2007); Glennon, supra note 6, at 20–21. 
8 Hennessy, supra note 5. Between 1960 and 1990 domestic uses of water in the West 
more than doubled and the region’s population grew seventy-five percent. Gregory J. Hobbs, 
Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 1, 16 (1997). In 2007 
an ongoing drought in the Southwest brought the Colorado River to its lowest levels since 
recorded measurements began. Gertner, supra note 6. Other projections showed that in 2007 
Lake Mead, the primary reservoir for Las Vegas, and Lake Powell in southern Utah held half 
of their capacity and were likely never to be full again. See id. 
9 Michael J. Cohen, Pac. Inst., Municipal Deliveries of Colorado River Basin Water 1–2 
(2011), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/co_river_municipal_deliveries/crb_water_6_ 
27_2011.pdf. 
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have emptied the Colorado River before it reaches its endpoint in the 
Sea of Cortez.10 Authorities expect that by 2030, populations depend-
ent on the River will increase fifty-three percent over their 2000 num-
bers.11 As a result, cities and towns across the Southwest have employed 
a variety of water-saving measures to avert immediate massive water-
shortages.12 Such actions, however, will not solve the water-shortage 
problem in the long-term.13 
                                                                                                                     
 In Colorado the water scarcity problem is compounded by the 
state’s strict adherence to the one hundred-year-old “first in time, first 
in right” prior appropriation system.14 Until Colorado significantly al-
ters the rule to take into account new environmental concerns, 
changed circumstances, and different economic demands, the prob-
lems of water scarcity in Colorado will continue to worsen.15 One ex-
ample of the consequences of strict adherence to prior appropriation is 
the Windy Gap diversion, the name given to water diverted from near 
the Windy Gap geologic formation in the Colorado Rockies.16 Under 
the prior appropriation system, the continued diversion of water from 
Windy Gap results in both economic inefficiency and significant envi-
ronmental devastation.17 
 Colorado, however, does not need to reinvent the wheel. Several 
states have dealt with the problems inherent in prior appropriation by 
 
10 Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 825, 826, 897 (2008); Will The Colorado River Survive?, Save the Colo., http:// 
savethecolorado.org/threats.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
11 Population Growth, Save the Colo., http://savethecolorado.org/threats.php (follow 
“Population Growth” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). Another projection expected that 
as of 1996 the West would grow at twice the national average. Paul R. Campbell, Population 
Projections for States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025, U.S. Census Bureau, 1 
(Oct. 1996), http://www.census.gov/population/projections/files/stateproj/ppl47.pdf. 
12 John J. Entsminger & Michael J. Brennan, The Challenges of Water for the Future of the 
West: Where Will We Get the Water?, 51 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. §§ 25.01, .02(6)(a), .03(5), 
.04(6) (2005); Felicity Barringer, Water Use in Southwest Heads for Day of Reckoning, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 28, 2010, at A16; Ashlie Rodriguez, Water Conservation: Sierra Club Rates L.A. and Orange 
County Cities, L.A. Times ( July 13, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
greenspace/2011/07/los-angeles-water-conservation-score-card-sierra-club.html; Texas City 
Rips up Grass in Effort to Save Water, KHOU.com, Aug. 27, 2011, http://www.khou.com/news/ 
texas-news/Texas-city-rips-up-grass-in-effort-to-save-water-128528368.html. 
13 See Cohen, supra note 9. 
14 See George Vranesh, Vranesh’s Colorado Water Law 7 ( James N. Corbridge, Jr. 
& Teresa A. Rice eds., 1999); Rebecca Abeln, Instream Flows, Recreation as Beneficial Use, and 
the Public Interest in Colorado Water Law, 8 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 517, 517 (2005); infra 
notes 59–79 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 189–249 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 163–174 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 231–249 and accompanying text. 
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integrating aspects of the public interest or public trust doctrines into 
their legal frameworks for water rights allocation.18 Though Colorado 
courts have expressly disclaimed both,19 the protective nature of the 
doctrines makes them particularly suited to reform the prior appro-
priation system.20 In the case of Windy Gap, creation of a public inter-
est system would encourage economic efficiency and environmental 
protection, and the public trust would allow integration of those values 
while protecting vested prior appropriation rights.21 
 Part I of this Note discusses the prior appropriation doctrine, its 
history, and the application of the rule in Colorado.22 Part II explores 
two other approaches to water law: the public interest and public trust 
doctrines, and their applications in New Mexico and California.23 Part 
III explains the Windy Gap project in Colorado.24 Finally, Part IV of this 
Note analyzes how changing conditions in Colorado have outdated 
strict application of the prior appropriation principle.25 Using the 
Windy Gap example, Part IV discusses the negative economic and envi-
ronmental costs associated with the prior appropriation system.26 To 
solve these problems, this Note suggests that Colorado should first cre-
ate a comprehensive body of public interest law outlining public inter-
est values.27 That body of law can then be integrated into a public trust, 
defining its scope, and providing protection to water as a resource 
while also guarding vested rights.28 
I. Prior Appropriation: The Colorado Doctrine 
 The doctrine of prior appropriation is the primary method for 
allocation of water in western states, including Colorado.29 It is best 
                                                                                                                      
18 See infra notes 85–89, 136–137 and accompanying text. 
19 Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P’ship, 929 P.2d 718, 725 
(Colo. 1996) (rejecting the public interest doctrine in Colorado); People v. Emmert, 597 
P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (rejecting the public trust doctrine in Colorado); see infra 
notes 90–94, 130–134 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 266–309 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 29–79 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 80–153 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 154–178 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 189–249 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 179–249 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 266–286 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 287–309 and accompanying text. 
29 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16; Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the 
Nineteen Western States 170–71 (1971); Vranesh, supra note 14, at 3. 
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known by the phrase “first in time, first in right.”30 Colorado’s founders 
fixed this right in the Colorado Constitution, stating, “[t]he right to 
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial 
uses shall never be denied.”31 Colorado adopted the rule to protect 
those people, typically miners and farmers, who put their time, energy, 
and economic investment into diverting water.32 Colorado adheres 
strictly to the prior appropriation rule.33 
A. Construction of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: The Rule and Its History 
 The prior appropriation doctrine allows a person to divert a quan-
tity of water from a source so long as he or she applies it to a beneficial 
use.34 That person, the “senior diverter,” then has the right to continue 
to use that quantity of water for the designated use.35 A second person, 
at a later date, may also divert water from the source for a beneficial 
use, but only up to what was left over from the first person.36 The rights 
of the first user limit the second user’s rights such that the junior di-
verter may not take water in any way that would harm the water rights 
of senior diverters.37 Among multiple diverters, water is apportioned 
according to the date of diversion with priority given to the earlier di-
versions.38 Because water is apportioned based on the date of diversion, 
in low water-flow years senior rights holders may receive their water to 
the exclusion of junior rights holders.39 
 Prior appropriation is the basis of western water law because it 
guarantees water rights to those who invest the energy and capital to 
access and use the water.40 The development of the prior appropriation 
system in the mid-1800s reflected the challenges faced by early set-
tlers.41 Gold miners’ distance from “civilized” settlements, the arid 
                                                                                                                      
30 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16. 
31 Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6; see also Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 
(1882) (recognizing that Colorado codified this doctrine in its constitution). 
32 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16. 
33 Abeln, supra note 14. 
34 Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447; Glennon, supra note 6, at 16–17; Joseph L. Sax, Water Law, 
Planning & Policy: Cases and Materials 218 (1968). 
35 Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982); Glennon, supra 
note 6, at 16–17. 
36 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16. 
37 See Sax, supra note 34. 
38 Navajo Dev. Co., 655 P.2d at 1377; Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446; Sax, supra note 34; Vranesh, 
supra note 14, at 1. 
39 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see Vranesh, supra note 14, at 3–7. 
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western landscape, and the necessity of water in working a mining 
claim led to the development of the prior appropriation system.42 The 
doctrine, a simple way to divide water rights, soon spread to agricultural 
areas in the Desert Southwest.43 The prior appropriation doctrine en-
couraged economic growth and development in the Frontier West by 
securing continued water rights for people who invested in accessing 
and using the water to make the land productive.44 
 The requirement that water diversions under prior appropriation 
must be applied to beneficial uses also reflects the goal of encouraging 
productivity.45 The beneficial use requirement was originally intended 
to stop attempts to hold water rights for speculative purposes and to 
encourage expedient use of all water resources.46 To accomplish these 
goals, the beneficial use constraint necessitates that appropriated water 
be used for specific activities that the law recognizes and protects.47 
 Though states determine what uses of water are “beneficial,” many, 
including Colorado, have not provided a comprehensive definition of 
what constitutes such a use.48 The Colorado Constitution recognizes 
                                                                                                                      
42 Glennon, supra note 6, at 15–16; Vranesh, supra note 14, at 5, 7; see also Irwin v. 
Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146–47 (1855) (finding that state mining law adopts the prior appro-
priation doctrine). 
43 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16; A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the 
New West, 41 Nat. Resources J. 769, 770 (2001). Like the miners, farmers had to divert 
water from rivers and streams to sustain their livelihood. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446; Armstrong 
v. Larimer Cnty. Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. App. 1891). Moving large quantities of 
water long distances, however, required a major physical effort and a large investment. 
Glennon, supra note 6, at 16. Farmers adopted the prior appropriation system because 
they were reluctant to undertake such big projects “without assurance that they would be 
rewarded by a consistent and reliable supply of water.” Id. 
44 Glennon, supra note 6, at 16; see Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446. 
45 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6; Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch 
Co., 98 P. 729, 731 (Colo. 1908); Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 967–68 (Colo. 1892) 
(noting that the beneficial use requirement was intended to discourage water speculation 
and encourage quick use of water resources); Vranesh, supra note 14, at 43. 
46 See Combs, 28 P. at 967–68. 
47 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6; Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 
F. 123, 128 (8th Cir. 1913) (holding that the list of beneficial uses stated in the Colorado 
Constitution should not be strictly construed). 
48 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6; Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3; Neb. Const. art. XV, § 6; 
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1983) (deciding 
that “beneficial use expresses a dynamic concept, which is a ‘variable according to condi-
tions,’ and therefore over time” (citations omitted)); City & Cnty. of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 
P.2d 836, 842 (Colo. 1939) (finding that “beneficial use” is not defined in Colorado’s Con-
stitution and that what constitutes a beneficial use depends on the facts of each case); 
State v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 930–31 (Idaho 1974) (finding that 
“beneficial use” has never been judicially or statutorily defined, and that its definition 
“must necessarily change with changing conditions”). 
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certain types of uses which are inherently beneficial, but does not ex-
plain the term “beneficial use.”49 The Colorado Water Right Determi-
nation and Administration Act of 1969 (“CWRDA”) eventually defined 
the term:50 
“Beneficial use” is the use of that amount of water that is rea-
sonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices 
to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appro-
priation is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recrea-
tional purposes, including fishery or wildlife . . . . 51 
Such a broad definition, however, is problematic because it does not 
help limit the variety of possible uses.52 Thus, courts have had difficulty 
delineating the boundaries of what constitutes a “beneficial use.”53 
 Furthermore, without a statutory definition of the term “waste,” 
the definition of “beneficial use” in Colorado remains imprecise.54 One 
definition of waste invites the idea of water squandered through exces-
sive use.55 However, courts have interpreted waste in a different fash-
                                                                                                                      
49 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6 (recognizing domestic, agricultural, and manufactur-
ing uses as beneficial); Sheriff, 96 P.2d at 842. 
50 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2011). The Act also created seven water divi-
sions within Colorado, charged with adjudicating and administering all water rights. See 
Act Concerning Water, and Enacting the “Water Right Determination and Administration 
Act of 1969”, ch. 373, § 20(1), 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1223 (repealing Article 13 of Chapter 
148, C.R.S. (1963)). Each division includes a water court and a division engineer. See id. 
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(4). 
52 See Vranesh, supra note 14, at 44. The CWRDA definition of beneficial use expands 
the traditional beneficial uses identified in the Colorado Constitution. Compare Colo. 
Const. art. XVI, § 6 (recognizing domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing uses as bene-
ficial), with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92--103(4) (including “the impoundment of water for 
recreational purposes . . . fishery or wildlife” as beneficial). 
53 See Vranesh, supra note 14, at 44–45; see, e.g., City of Thornton v. City of Fort 
Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 930–31 (Colo. 1992) (finding that an instream diversion of water 
could be a beneficial use); Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache la Poudre Water Users 
Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164, 173 (Colo. 1988) (allowing ponds for recreation as a beneficial use); 
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Brown, 138 P. 44, 49–50 (Colo. 1913) (finding that irrigation of 
trees and grasses within city parks is a beneficial use); see also Christine A. Klein, The Consti-
tutional Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 343, 349 (1995) (arguing that 
swimming pools, fountains, and skating rinks are also probably beneficial uses). 
54 Vranesh, supra note 14, at 44; see Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and 
the Future of Water Law, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257, 265 n.24 (1990) (discussing how waste, 
like beneficial use, is a dynamic concept). 
55 Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency 
in Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 928–29 (1998). 
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ion—any water left in the streambed is considered wasted.56 Some 
commentators have also described waste as “forfeiture.”57 Under that 
definition, diverters could legally lose their rights to any portion of 
their water that they fail to divert in a given year.58 
B. Colorado’s Strict Application of the Prior Appropriation Rule 
 The common law prior appropriation doctrine controlled Colo-
rado water law even before Colorado entered the Union.59 In 1876 the 
Colorado Constitution codified the principle, entrenching it as the 
primary doctrine governing surface water appropriations.60 Six years 
later the Colorado Supreme Court solidified the doctrine’s role in 
Colorado law, holding that “in the absence of express statutes to the 
contrary, the first appropriator of water from a natural stream for a 
beneficial purpose has . . . a prior right thereto, to the extent of such 
appropriation.”61 Colorado’s lead in the early development and appli-
cation of prior appropriation earned the rule the nickname “The Colo-
rado Doctrine.”62 
 Colorado courts typically apply the prior appropriation doctrine 
strictly—allocating water rights based on a first-come, first-served basis 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1327–28 
(Colo. 1975) (Groves, J., concurring) (describing how the waste created by water-using 
vegetation robs water rights holders of their “decreed rights”); Metro. Suburban Water 
Users Ass’n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 281 (Colo. 1961) (rec-
ognizing “the great public and private benefits which emanate from conserving and put-
ting to beneficial use, at the earliest practical time, all of the waters of the natural streams 
of the state of Colorado”). 
57 Neuman, supra note 55, at 928 n.53. I have chosen to use the word “waste” through-
out this Note to describe water left in the waterway. 
58 Harrison C. Dunning, The “Physical Solution” in Western Water Law, 57 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 445, 454 (1986). Although the requirement for water to be used for a beneficial use 
exists to lessen the waste of water, the “use it or lose it” consequence often means that 
much water is wasted regardless. Id. at 447. 
59 See An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public 
Lands, and for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866), repealed by Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706, 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761–1771 (2006)) (stating that “whenever, by priority of posses-
sion, rights to the use of water . . . have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized 
and acknowledged . . . the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained 
and protected in the same”); Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446 (noting that priority of appropriation 
“and the obligation to protect it, existed prior to legislation”). 
60 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6. 
61 Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447. 
62 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, L.L.P., 45 P.3d 693, 706–08 
(Colo. 2002) (discussing the rise of the “Colorado Doctrine”); Vranesh, supra note 14, at 
32. 
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provided the water is put to a beneficial use.63 In Santa Fe Trail Ranches 
Property Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, the Colorado Supreme Court limited 
the rule’s flexibility by finding that prior appropriation rights extended 
only to the original-decreed use of that water.64 In this case, in the early 
1900s a water division had specifically designated the original water 
rights for domestic and manufacturing uses.65 Despite these specified 
uses, from 1966 to 1985 the diverter leased the water rights to a ditch 
company that used the water for irrigation.66 In the late 1990s, Santa Fe 
Ranches sought officially to change the use of the water right from 
manufacturing to municipal uses in order to supply water to a subdivi-
sion in southern Colorado.67 The court determined that, “the right to 
change a . . . type, place, or time of use, is limited . . . by the appropria-
tion’s historic use.”68 Therefore, the amount of water Santa Fe Ranches 
could transfer to use for municipal and other purposes depended 
“upon the historic . . . use of the appropriation for its decreed pur-
pose.”69 
 In Empire Lodge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Moyer the Colorado Supreme 
Court also applied the prior appropriation doctrine strictly, enjoining 
upstream appropriators from making out-of-priority diversions to fill two 
ponds.70 Empire Lodge, a homeowners’ association, had an original 
diversion right that did not include appropriation for the two ponds.71 
Although Empire Lodge could have submitted a plan for augmentation 
of the original diversion, thus allowing an out-of-priority diversion,72 the 
homeowners’ association did not enter such a plan.73 Thus, holding fast 
to the original prior appropriation doctrine, the court reaffirmed that 
                                                                                                                      
63 Abeln, supra note 14; see supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. One commentator 
suggested that prior appropriation is not typically strictly applied, but is merely a threat. A. 
Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 881, 883 (2000). 
64 990 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. 1999). 
65 Id. at 49–50. 
66 Id. at 50. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 54. 
69 Id. at 59. The court recognized the argument that because there was no official 
change to the original decreed water rights uses, the water may be considered unused and 
therefore the owners right to the water may no longer exist. Id. at 57. 
70 39 P.3d 1139, 1143–44 (Colo. 2001). The ponds were being used for fishing and rec-
reation at a subdivision. Id. at 1143. 
71 Id. at 1144. 
72 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302 (2011); Moyer, 39 P.3d at 1150; see also Williams v. Mid-
way Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo. 1997) (safeguarding the protec-
tion of senior water rights by authorizing out-of-priority diversions so long as the decreed 
water rights receive a replacement water supply that offsets the out-of-priority depletions). 
73 Moyer, 39 P.3d at 1145. 
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water rights must be administered based on their priority, and upheld 
an injunction prohibiting the out-of-priority diversion.74 
 Despite historical application of the prior appropriation rule for 
physical diversions, recent statutory changes and court decisions have 
expanded the traditional doctrine.75 In 1973 the Colorado legislature 
passed an instream flow statute authorizing the Colorado Water Con-
servation Board “to appropriate . . . such waters of natural streams and 
lakes as the board determines may be required for minimum stream 
flows . . . to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable de-
gree.”76 The instream flow statute allows the Colorado Water Conserva-
tion Board to keep water it owns within a streambed without losing its 
right to the water.77 Furthermore, in 1992 the Colorado Supreme 
Court interpreted a “diversion” to include water within a natural water 
course, and not just water physically taken out of a stream.78 These in-
stream applications run counter to the typical tenants of prior appro-
priation and allow parties to hold water rights within a stream without 
the typical physical diversion.79 
                                                                                                                     
II. Approaches to Preserving Water: The Public Interest and 
Public Trust 
 In contrast to the prior appropriation doctrine, many states deal 
with water as a precious resource by providing the state and its govern-
ment agencies with authority to protect its use.80 The public interest 
 
 
74 See id. at 1148, 1160 (finding that priority “is the most important stick in the water 
rights bundle”). 
75 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3) (2011) (authorizing the Colorado Water Conserva-
tion Board to appropriate water so as to maintain minimum stream flows); City of Thornton, 
830 P.2d at 930 (interpreting dams and other instream diversions to be valid appropria-
tions). 
76 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3); Reed D. Benson, “Adequate Progress,” or Rivers Left 
Behind? Developments in Colorado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36 Envtl. L. 
1283, 1286 (2006). However, the term “a reasonable degree” is undefined. Id. at 1287. 
77 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3). 
78 City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Upper 
Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838 P. 2d 840, 854 (Colo. 1992) (interpreting a 
“diversion” to include water that remains within the watercourse so long as it is put to a 
beneficial use). 
79 Compare supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (describing the rules of prior ap-
propriation), with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3) (allowing the Colorado Water Conser-
vation Board to appropriate water to preserve instream flows), and City of Thornton, 830 
P.2d at 930 (interpreting a diversion to include water within a watercourse). 
80 Ala. Const. art. I, § 24 (creating a public trust); Alaska Const. art. VIII, §§ 3, 13, 
14 (creating a public trust); Cal. Const. art. X, § 3, 4 (creating a public trust); Ariz. Rev. 
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doctrine statutorily requires the agency granting water rights to deter-
mine if such a grant would harm the public interest.81 Under the pub-
lic trust doctrine, a body of both statutory and common law,82 the state 
holds title to certain waters in trust for public purposes, thus protecting 
the waters from private ownership.83 
A. The Public Interest Doctrine 
1. The Rule 
 Sixteen of the eighteen western continental states have enacted 
statutes that require public interest review for new water appropria-
tions.84 Under public interest review, prior to an appropriation a desig-
nated body must determine whether granting a water permit will harm 
the public interest.85 Among the states that have adopted public inter-
est review, statutes defining the “public interest” vary.86 Some state stat-
utes define “public interest” by identifying concrete values important 
for public interest consideration.87 For example, Oregon specifies that 
public interest concerns should include “public recreation, protection 
of commercial and game fishing and wildlife . . . or any other beneficial 
use to which the water may be applied for which it may have a special 
value to the public.”88 In contrast, Alaska’s public interest review re-
mains open-ended, requiring the issuing agency to weigh the proposed 
appropriation’s effects on harm to other people, economic activity, fish 
                                                                                                                      
Stat. Ann. §§ 45-153 (2003) (creating a public interest system); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 90.03.290 (2004) (creating a public interest system). 
81 Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation in the West, 9 
U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 485, 486 (2006). 
82 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475–91 (1970). 
83 Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3, 8–9 (Cal. 1967). 
84 Grant, supra note 81. Oklahoma removed public interest review from its system in 
1963, and Colorado does not have public interest review. Id. at 486 n.1. 
85 Abeln, supra note 14, at 533; Grant, supra note 81. 
86 See Alaska Stat. § 46.15.080 (2010) (requiring application of an open-ended public 
interest review); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-401 (2003) (identifying groundwater protec-
tion as an important public interest); Or. Rev. Stat. § 537.170(8)(a) (2011) (specifying 
fishing and wildlife as important public interests); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.54.010 (2004) 
(identifying natural resources and public health as important public interests). 
87 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-401 (identifying groundwater protection as im-
portant); Wash. Rev. Code § 90.54.010 (identifying natural resources and public health as 
important). 
88 Or. Rev. Stat. § 537.170(8)(a). 
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and game resources, public health, navigable and public waters, and 
other uses of the water.89 
 Despite recognition of the state legislature’s intent to protect public 
interest concerns,90 Colorado courts avoid implementing such consid-
erations by framing the public interest as a legislative or public policy 
question.91 Though some Colorado courts have embraced public inter-
est considerations in their decisions,92 the lack of statutory authority on 
the subject means courts are not required to consider public interest 
factors when adjudicating water rights.93 As a result, some Colorado 
courts have rejected a public interest review of water rights, contending 
that such an analysis “conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion.”94 
 Public interest laws fall under two possible models—a “maximum 
benefits” model and an “other laws” model.95 Under the maximum 
benefits model, when deciding between possible uses, issuing agen-
cies—and courts—must choose the use that maximizes the utility of the 
water.96 Typically, deciding what uses provide the maximum benefit in-
volves identifying and applying unwritten public policy, an inherently 
open-ended question.97 Several western states adopted this type of pub-
lic interest review because it could be used to ensure that an appropria-
tion maximized the economic benefits to a community.98 This flexible 
                                                                                                                      
 
89 Alaska Stat. § 46.15.080. 
90 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3) (2011) (vesting the Colorado Water Conservation 
Board with exclusive authority to maintain minimum streams flows to maintain the natural 
environment); Abeln, supra note 14, at 534–35 (describing the public interest in Colorado 
water law). 
91 R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass’n, 690 P.2d 823, 828 (Colo. 1984); Abeln, supra note 
14, at 537. 
92 Wadsworth v. Kuiper, 562 P.2d 1114, 1116–17 (Colo. 1977) (finding that the Colo-
rado Constitution implies “a vital interest in preserving the water resources of this state” 
and “mandates the protection of the public interest in water”); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & 
Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841, 875–
78 (1989) (suggesting that the Colorado courts’ application of the prior appropriation 
doctrine itself actually furthers the public interest). 
93 Abeln, supra note 14, at 537–38. 
94 Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P’ship, 929 P.2d 718, 725 
(Colo. 1996); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995). 
95 Grant, supra note 81, at 488. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 488–49. 
98 See Commonwealth Power Co. v. State Bd. of Irrigation, Highways & Drainage, 143 
N.W. 937, 938–39 (Neb. 1913) (noting that the purpose of public interest review is to fur-
ther economic development of the state through the use of its waters); Young & Norton v. 
Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910) (discussing at length the economic implica-
tions to the public interest from allowing one appropriation to proceed at the expense of 
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model allows courts to consider interests beyond the purely economic 
ones.99 
 Under the “other laws” model of public interest review, agencies 
and courts must consider explicit statutory or constitutional policies 
prior to allowing an appropriation.100 They must evaluate the written 
statutory policies of the state where the appropriation would take place 
and are required to grant proposed appropriations in accordance with 
those policies.101 For example, in Texas the water appropriation laws 
were passed after a constitutional provision declared preservation and 
conservation of the waters of the state to be a public interest objec-
tive.102 Thus, in Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co. the Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals found that the water appropriation laws must be construed in 
light of the constitutional amendment’s explicit water conservation and 
protection objectives.103 
2. Application of the Public Interest Doctrine in New Mexico 
 New Mexico case decisions exemplify the flexibility that public in-
terest review affords the state in making determinations about whether 
an appropriation is in the public interest.104 New Mexico first adopted 
public interest review for water appropriations in 1907 when the legisla-
ture gave the state’s territorial engineer the power to deny applications 
that were contrary to the public interest.105 The broad considerations 
employed by public interest review give courts significant discretion in 
                                                                                                                      
another); Grant, supra note 81, at 492 (stating that “[t]he maximum-benefits model of 
public interest review was well-suited to the single-minded ethic [in the West] favoring 
maximum economic development”). 
99 Grant, supra note 81, at 490. 
100 Id. at 489. 
101 Id. 
102 Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59(a); Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co., 200 S.W.2d 674, 680 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
103 200 S.W.2d at 680, 682; Grant, supra note 81, at 494 (finding that “[b]y relying on 
the constitutional and statutory policy provisions and making no mention of unwritten 
public policy, the court seemed implicitly to embrace the other-laws model of public inter-
est review”). 
104 See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984) (noting that the 
public interest is “a broad term including health and safety, recreational, aesthetic, envi-
ronmental and economic interests”); Grant, supra note 81, at 499–500. 
105 See Young & Norton, 110 P. at 1048. 
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considering which public policies to employ.106 New Mexico courts 
have considered both economic and cultural effects.107 
                                                                                                                     
 In Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
reflected primarily on the economic effects of the public interest re-
view.108 The Young & Norton case concerned conflicting appropriations 
of water—one for a larger project and one for a smaller project.109 The 
court assessed the case on economic grounds, highlighting the dra-
matic consequences that allowing excessive appropriation from a 
stream would have on future investment in irrigation projects.110 Thus, 
the court found that the smaller project should get the appropriation 
because the larger project failed the economic test.111 
 In contrast, in one author describes how the New Mexico trial 
court included economic and cultural effects on a rural New Mexico 
community in its public interest review.112 In In re Sleeper, the court 
found that allowing the transfer of water rights to a resort would not be 
economically beneficial to the community and would destroy the local 
agrarian culture, which had deep roots among the residents.113 Sleeper’s 
approach focused on the public interest as it affected individual com-
munities.114 In practice, however, New Mexico’s courts have had diffi-
culty ascertaining the geographic and temporal boundaries of the 
community to be considered in a public interest review.115 The courts’ 
 
 
106 Grant, supra note 81, at 490. 
107 Young & Norton, 110 P. at 1050 (considering the economic effects); Grant, supra 
note 81, at 499–500 (discussing how at least one New Mexico court has incorporated cul-
tural values in public interest review). 
108 110 P. at 1050. 
109 Id. at 1046. 
110 Id. at 1050. 
111 Id. 
112 Grant, supra note 81, at 499–500. Though the court overturned the case on appeal, 
the appellate court found only that deciding the case on the basis of public interest con-
siderations was invalid. Grant, supra note 81, at 500. The court had no need (and did not) 
address whether cultural values ought to be a part of a public interest review when it is 
conducted. Id. 
113 Id. at 499–500 (discussing the court’s finding that transferring “‘water rights, de-
voted for more than a century to agricultural purposes, in order to construct a playground 
for those who can pay is a poor trade, indeed’” (citation omitted)). 
114 Id. at 514. 
115 Compare Grant, supra note 81, at 499–500 (discussing In re Application of Sleeper’s, 760 
P.2d at 792–93, identification of the resort community as the protected group and dismiss-
ing the interests of the larger geographic area), with City of El Paso, 597 F. Supp. at 700, 708 
(identifying the citizens of New Mexico as the protected group). New Mexico’ undefined 
public interest standard remains an open question. See Grant supra note 81, at 500. See also 
Young & Norton, 110 p. at 1050 (recognizing current and future residents within temporal 
boundaries); Grant, supra note 81, at 514–16 (recognizing the difficulty in establishing 
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flexible discretion in crafting their answers to these questions high-
lights the open-ended nature of the public interest inquiry. 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine 
1. The Rule 
 Unlike the public interest doctrine, the core of the trust concept 
lies in a state’s ownership of “all of its navigable waterways and the lands 
lying beneath them ‘as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the 
people.’”116 The trust-like nature of the doctrine instills it with much of 
its strength.117 The doctrine holds that the state (the trustee) manages 
certain resources (the trust principal) and is required to maintain them 
for use by current and future generations (the beneficiaries).118 The 
state, as trustee, has a continuing duty of supervision “over the taking 
and use of the appropriated water.”119 Public trust lands may not be 
bought or sold privately, because doing so would contradict the state’s 
responsibilities under the trust.120 Additionally, like a financial trust, the 
beneficiaries have the ability to enforce the trust terms.121 Thus, citizens, 
                                                                                                                      
 
geographical and temporal boundaries for public interest review); Richard A. Posner, Ani-
mal Rights, 110 Yale L.J. 527, 534 (2000) (reviewing Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: 
Toward Legal Rights for Animals (2000)) (noting that “nothing in utilitarianism estab-
lishes the boundaries of the community whose happiness is to be maximized”). A related 
but more philosophical question, unaddressed and unanswered by the courts, is whether 
in maximizing the benefits of a water supply, the goal should be to make a small group of 
people very happy or make a larger group of people only somewhat happy. Grant, supra 
note 81, at 515. 
116 Colberg, 432 P.2d at 8; see also Ill. Cent. R.R., v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). The public trust traces its origins 
back to Roman models of common property. Sax, supra note 82, at 475. Under the Roman 
Emperor Justinian, the air, rivers, sea, and seashore were dedicated to the public’s use and 
could not be privately owned. J. Inst. 2.1.1. 
117 See infra notes 118–132 and accompanying text. 
118 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; Colberg, 432 P.2d at 8–9; Consuelo Bokum, Implement-
ing the Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico’s Water Code, 36 Nat. Resources J. 681, 685 
(1996); see also Stephen H. Leonhardt & Brent A. Waite, The Public Trust Doctrine: What It Is, 
Where It Came from, and Why Colorado Doesn’t (and Shouldn’t) Have One, in Colo. Water Res. 
Research Inst., Colo. Water Workshop: Quenching the Urban Giant 190, 191 (1994), 
available at http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/IS/78.pdf (stating that trying to de-
fine the public trust doctrine is “like trying to nail Jello to the wall”). 
119 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983). 
120 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; Sax, supra note 82, at 489 (stating that “the Court 
determined that the states have special regulatory obligations over shorelands . . . which 
are inconsistent with large-scale private ownership”). 
121 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716 n.11; see Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 
Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 600–01 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding that the public could sue the 
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as beneficiaries, have the right to sue the state, as the trustee, for failing 
to uphold its trust duties.122 
 Early public trust cases in the United States asserted the state’s au-
thority over navigable and tidal waters, and the land beneath it, for the 
use of the people.123 During the early and mid-1900s, the principal 
purpose of the trust was for the economic benefit of the citizens of a 
state.124 The public trust allowed states to hold title to navigable waters 
and tidal lands based on their close economic relationship to com-
merce, fisheries, and navigation.125 For example, in a seminal public 
trust case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld 
the state’s authority to hold title to all submerged land within its bor-
ders and found that the public had the right to fish, navigate, and en-
gage in commerce on those waters.126 Furthermore, this public trust 
right prevented the Illinois legislature from transferring a portion of 
Chicago lakefront to private ownership.127 
 As public views on the benefits of water have shifted over time to 
recognize its environmental importance, the scope of the public trust 
doctrine has similarly evolved beyond its economic protection ori-
gins.128 Consequently, some courts have created an “ecological public 
trust,” using the public trust doctrine to protect resources based on 
their “exhaustible and irreplaceable nature.”129 
                                                                                                                      
appropriate state agency for failing to protect wildlife from death and injury by turbines 
on private wind farms). 
122 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716 n.11; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 602. 
123 Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 411–12 
(1842); Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 
(1821). 
124 See Colberg, 432 P.2d at 9 (noting that many courts in this era have interpreted the 
principle trust purposes as fishing, navigation, and commerce). 
125 See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; Colberg, 432 P.2d at 9. 
126 146 U.S. at 452. 
127 Id. at 453–56. 
128 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; 
Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 
(Or. 1979). In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court identified the public trust as 
a unit that is “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.” 491 P.2d at 380. 
The court recognized both the historic economic uses of the trust and the growing impor-
tance of maintaining tidelands in their natural state “so that they may serve as ecological 
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habi-
tat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the 
area.” Id. 
129 Morse, 581 P.2d at 524; Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: 
An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393, 403–10 (1991); see 
Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719. 
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 Although a number of states have recognized aspects of the public 
trust doctrine through statutory or constitutional provisions,130 Colo-
rado has held fast to its prior appropriation roots.131 This is likely due 
to the fundamental conflict between the public trust doctrine— forbid-
ding certain public resources from being bought or sold—and the pri-
vate property rights protected by the prior appropriation system.132 
Thus, despite statutory and constitutional elements of the public trust 
doctrine in its law,133 Colorado courts have explicitly rejected a public 
trust as it relates to water.134 
2. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in California135 
 California has one of the more sophisticated applications of the 
public trust doctrine.136 The state is a prominent example because it 
                                                                                                                      
130 See Restoring the Trust: An Index of State Constitutional and Statutory Provisions and Cases 
on Water Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine, Center for Progressive Reform (Sept. 
2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/PubTrust_State_table_2009.pdf (listing 
the sources of public trust law in each state). 
131 People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Colo. 1979). 
132 See id. Compare Sax, supra note 82, at 489 (describing how the public trust instills the 
state with special regulatory obligations that are inconsistent with large-scale private own-
ership), with supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (identifying prior appropriation as 
a private property system). 
133 Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5 (stating, “the water of every natural stream . . . [is] the 
property of the public”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(1), (3) (2011) (stating that surface 
waters “have always been and are hereby declared to be the property of the public,” and 
also vesting the Colorado Water Conservation Board with trustee-like duties to appropriate 
water to “preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree”). 
134 Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 
1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (“This court has never recognized the public 
trust doctrine with respect to water.”); Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 (finding that the Colorado 
Constitution preserves “the historical appropriation system of water rights upon which the 
irrigation economy in Colorado was founded” and does not “assure public access to waters 
for purposes other than appropriation”). But see Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d at 
1260 (finding that the Colorado Water Conservation Board has “a unique statutory fiduci-
ary duty to protect the public in the administration of its water rights decreed to preserve 
the natural environment”); Alethea O’Donnell, Comment, Something Old, Something New: 
Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to Snowmaking, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 159, 186–90 
(1996) (discussing Colorado Water Conservation Board and the public trust doctrine in Colo-
rado). 
135 See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doc-
trines: Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 
1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology 
L.Q. 53 (2010). 
136 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595–603. 
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has both widened the public trust to include ecological resources and 
integrated the public trust with historical water rights.137 
 In 1971 the California Supreme Court recognized that the public 
trust was “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,” and 
therefore, widened the trust’s scope beyond its economic protection 
origins.138 This opened the door for protection of valuable environ-
mental resources beyond navigable waters such as old growth forests, 
mountains, and wildlife.139 In Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL 
Group, Inc. the California Court of Appeal found that the public trust 
included wildlife.140 In State v. Superior Court, the California Supreme 
Court extended public trust protections to a shore-zone, recognizing 
the area as a “fragile and complex resource” that “provides the envi-
ronment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish . . . birds 
. . . and many other species of wildlife and plants.”141 
 California also successfully integrated the public trust doctrine 
with other applicable water rights systems.142 In National Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), the California Supreme Court found that 
the public trust doctrine and prior appropriation water rights are “parts 
of an integrated system of water law,” and both must be considered 
when determining appropriate use of water in California.143 In Mono 
Lake, Los Angeles had been diverting most of Mono Lake’s tributary 
waters away from the lake for more than forty years, resulting in severe 
impairment of the environmental integrity of the lake.144 When citizen 
                                                                                                                      
137 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595–600; 
Rieser, supra note 129, at 393–94. California has both riparian and prior appropriation 
systems of water law. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980). 
138 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. 
139 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595–600; Rieser, supra note 129, at 
393–94. 
140 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597–98 (noting that wildlife’s transient nature means it “be-
long[s] to no one, and therefore . . . belong[s] to everyone in common”). 
141 625 P.2d 256, 259–60 (Cal. 1981) (highlighting the ecological importance of shore-
zones and their human-created scarcity). 
142 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728 (“The state has an affirmative duty to take the public 
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public 
trust uses whenever feasible.”). 
143 Id. at 732. 
144 Id. at 714–16. The lake area shrunk by almost twenty-five square miles and its sur-
face level dropped forty-three feet. Id at 714. The exposed lake-bed silt was easily airborne 
and caused respiratory distress to humans and animals. Id. at 716. The shrinking size of 
the lake gave predators access to birds nesting on islands, resulting in a ninety-five percent 
loss of California Gull chicks in 1981. Id. A corresponding increase in the lake’s salinity 
caused a ninety-five percent reduction in the brine shrimp hatch in the same year. Id. at 
715. In turn, the lack of available shrimp had a devastating impact on the feeding birds 
and the local shrimping industry. Id. at 715, 716. 
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groups ultimately sued, the California Supreme Court required Los 
Angeles to reconsider the diversions in light of the lake’s environ-
mental importance under the public trust.145 The public trust imposed 
a duty on the state to protect water-related resources by avoiding or 
minimizing harm when feasible.146 Thus, despite the primary role of 
prior appropriation water rights in California water law, the court lim-
ited the exercise of those rights by requiring that there be no major 
harm to the public trust.147 Notably, the court did not totally dismiss 
prior appropriation rights and allowed Los Angeles’ diversions to con-
tinue on a reduced scale.148 
 Since the Mono Lake decision, California courts have reaffirmed 
the idea that traditional water rights rules under the prior appropria-
tion system are not absolute.149 In El Dorado Irrigation District v. State Wa-
ter Resources Control Board the California Court of Appeal accepted that 
competing interests and principles, such as the public trust, may re-
quire deviation from strict application of the prior appropriation sys-
tem.150 Similarly, in People v. Murrison the court observed that water 
rights are subject to the state’s interest in wildlife protection.151 The 
court, however, has limited the superiority of the public trust to only 
those circumstances where direct application of the prior appropria-
tion rule would clearly result in harm to the public trust.152 When the 
two systems of water rights directly clash, as in Mono Lake, the public 
trust prevails only to the extent necessary to prevent harm to public 
trust values.153 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. at 729, 732. 
146 Id. at 712. 
147 Id. at 712, 721, 727, 732. The court stated four times that parties may not acquire 
vested rights in a manner harmful to trust resources. See id. 
148 Restoration: Repairing a Damaged Ecosystem, Mono Lake Committee, http://www. 
monolake.org/mlc/restoration (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
149 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 604 (highlighting the balancing that 
must be done between demands on a resource and environmental protection); El Dorado 
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 490 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(arguing that when the prior appropriation rule clashes with the rule against unreason-
able use or the public trust doctrine, the rule of priority must yield); People v. Murrison, 
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68, 76 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the state possesses “sovereign power 
to protect its wildlife” and that the defendant’s “water rights are subject to these powers”). 
150 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91. 
151 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76. 
152 See El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491. 
153 See 658 P.2d at 728, 732; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91. 
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III. Windy Gap: An Illustration of the Tensions Inherent in the 
Prior Appropriation System in Colorado 
A. The C-BT Project: An Unreliable Source of Water 
 The Colorado-Big Thompson (“C-BT”) Project distributes ap-
proximately 213,000 acre feet of water from the Colorado River to 
more than 850,000 people along the Colorado Front Range for agricul-
tural, municipal, and industrial uses.154 The impetus for the project was 
a major drought that affected farms and agricultural production in 
northeastern Colorado in the 1930s.155 As a result of the drought, 
communities along the Front Range realized their arid land alone 
could not support their growing needs.156 Thus, Northern Water157 de-
signed the C-BT Project to consistently deliver much needed water to 
dry Front Range communities.158 
 The C-BT project diverts water from the Colorado River just below 
its headwaters, and stores it primarily in Lake Granby, a large reservoir 
just south of Rocky Mountain National Park.159 Fully completed in 
1957, the C-BT Project consists of reservoirs on the east and west slopes 
of the Continental Divide that are connected by a long tunnel.160 A se-
ries of canals and pipelines then disperse the water to municipalities 
and other users.161 The C-BT Project supplies approximately 230,000 
                                                                                                                      
154 C-BT History, N. Water, http://www.northernwater.org/AboutUs/C-BTHistory.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013); Colorado-Big Thompson Project, N. Water, http://www.northernwater. 
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northernwater.org/docs/MediaAndNews/CBT_NwBroch.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
156 See id. 
157 Northern Water is the public agency that oversees and implements the C-BT Project. 
Who We Are, N. Water, http://www.northernwater.org/AboutUs/WhoWeAre.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 9, 2013). 
158 See N. Water, supra note 155. 
159 Id. at 4, 10, 12. 
160 Id. at 6, 10, 12, 15, 16. 
161 How the Colorado-Big Thompson Project Works, N. Water, http://www.northernwater. 
org/WaterProjects/HowtheC-BTWorks.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
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acre-feet of water per year to communities and other users along the 
Front Range.162 
B. Windy Gap: A Water Storage Problem 
 In the 1960s a number of Front Range communities began to 
worry that their growth rates, and an expected increase in the demand 
of water, would soon outstrip their supply from the C-BT Project.163 
Therefore, these cities pursued additional water rights to meet their 
growing needs.164 In 1967 the Longmont, Colorado mayor, on behalf of 
six northern Colorado cities, filed for additional water rights from the 
Colorado River.165 These additional water rights materialized into the 
Windy Gap Project.166 Like the C-BT Project, the Windy Gap Project 
diverts water from the Colorado River for use by a subset of Front 
Range communities.167 Workers completed the Windy Gap Project in 
1985.168 
 Water storage issues, however, have prevented water from the 
Windy Gap Project from reliably reaching the communities it serves.169 
Currently, most Windy Gap water is stored in Lake Granby along with 
the C-BT Project water.170 Under Colorado’s strict adherence to the 
prior appropriation doctrine, the senior water rights of the C-BT Pro-
ject have left little space in Lake Granby for the junior Windy Gap Pro-
                                                                                                                      
162 Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Description of the 
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163 See N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., The Windy Gap Project 3, http://www. 
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Search-www.dailycamera.com-www.dailycamera.com (last updated Dec. 10, 2011). 
170 See id.; Windy Gap Project, N. Water, http://www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/ 
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ter, http://www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/HowWindyGapWorks.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013). 
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ject water.171 During wet years Lake Granby is often full of the senior C-
BT Project water, leaving no room for junior Windy Gap Project wa-
ter.172 Conversely, in dry years, the Windy Gap communities do not get 
their additional allocations because their junior water rights prevent 
them from drawing from the river.173 Thus, the availability of the Windy 
Gap Project water to its participants is highly unreliable and dependent 
on a number of unpredictable variables.174 
C. The Windy Gap Firming Project 
 To help solve the reliability problem of Windy Gap Project water, 
Northern Water proposed the Windy Gap Firming Project.175 The 
Windy Gap Firming Project would pump designated Windy Gap water, 
using the C-BT infrastructure, directly to a separate Windy Gap reser-
voir to be constructed along the Front Range.176 Construction of a dedi-
cated Windy Gap reservoir, separate from Lake Granby, would give the 
communities the ability to store designated Windy Gap water.177 Conse-
quently, the amount of water reliably available to the Front Range com-
munities would increase.178 
IV. Changing Colorado Water Law: Responding to the Problems 
of Prior Appropriation in the New West 
 Colorado has strictly adhered to the prior appropriation rule.179 
Thus, water rights, such as those allocated in the 1960s for the Windy 
Gap Project, have historically been distributed under the rule of prior-
ity.180 Colorado’s social and economic structures have changed over 
time, however, rendering the prior appropriation rule outdated.181 Fur-
                                                                                                                      
171 See Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, N. Water, http://www. 
northernwater.org/WaterProjects/WGFProjectOverview.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
172 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
173 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
174 See Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
175 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
176 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
177 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
178 Snider, supra note 169; Windy Gap Firming Overview, supra note 171. 
179 See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 189–198 and accompanying text. See generally Reed D. Benson, Alive 
but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 83 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 675, 678 n.17 (2012) (declaring that prior appropriation may be “mostly dead” like 
the hero Westley in The Princess Bride); Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appro-
priation 1848–1991, 21 Envtl. L. v (eulogizing prior appropriation). 
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thermore, the state’s inflexible application of the rule and failure to 
take social values into account result in significant negative economic 
and environmental consequences.182 
 Given the changes in Colorado’s social and economic structures, 
Colorado’s water law must evolve to protect the environment and pre-
vent the overuse of a scarce resource.183 Without such considerations, 
water use and consumption are likely to outpace supply, causing both 
major water shortages and significant environmental consequences.184 
Thus, despite explicit renunciation of the public trust and public inter-
est doctrines,185 Colorado courts and administrative bodies must incor-
porate into Colorado water law the values and ideas that come from 
those doctrines to help make water sustainable.186 First, Colorado 
should create a public interest system that outlines specific values of 
importance to the community.187 Then, the state should use those val-
ues to establish a comprehensive public trust that, like in California, 
can be integrated with the prior appropriation system.188 
A. The New West: Prior Appropriation Is Outdated 
 Historically, the doctrine of prior appropriation was a useful tool 
for allocating water rights.189 When the West was primarily a farming 
and mining economy, the prior appropriation doctrine was a simple and 
efficient solution to the problem of allocating water rights.190 It allowed 
farmers to expand agriculturally because they could rely on consistent 
diversions of water from rivers and streams to sustain their fields.191 In 
the predominantly agrarian, frontier economy, the requirement that an 
                                                                                                                      
182 See infra notes 202–249 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra notes 250–265 and accompanying text. 
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appropriation be for a beneficial use both encouraged development 
and adequately prevented the squandering of water.192 
 Colorado, however, is no longer primarily an agrarian society.193 
Municipal, industrial, and domestic practices increasingly dominate the 
water needs in modern Colorado.194 Throughout the West, communi-
ties are becoming less dependent on irrigated agriculture and raw 
commodity production.195 At the same time, Colorado’s climate, moun-
tains, and ruggedness are increasingly recognized as important to an 
economy dependent on tourism and outdoor recreation.196 Economic 
benefits from natural beauty and diverse recreational activities, rather 
than from natural resource development, now provide significant sup-
port to Colorado towns.197 Thus, the prior appropriation doctrine pro-
tects historical, yet currently outdated, uses of water.198 
B. Disadvantages of Prior Appropriation in the New West 
 Colorado’s changing culture, including its decreasing reliance on 
agriculture, exposes the inflexibility of the prior appropriation doc-
trine.199 Most importantly, in granting new water rights under the prior 
appropriation doctrine, the law does not require that courts take into 
account the water use’s economic efficiency or environmental conse-
quences.200 These deficiencies remain despite the theoretical limits 
                                                                                                                      
192 See Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892) (discussing how the bene-
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(1994). 
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note 43, at 773. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 181. 
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200 See Abeln, supra note 14, at 536–38. 
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placed on prior appropriation rights by the requirement that water be 
put to a beneficial use and the prohibition against waste.201 
1. Inefficient Use of Resources 
 Strict enforcement of the prior appropriation doctrine leads to 
inefficient use of water as a resource.202 As one author noted, “[t]here 
is as yet no answer for the problem which arises when a farmer . . . 
pour[s] excessive quantities of water on his land and thus deprives a 
neighbor of needed water.”203 The inherent inflexibility of the priority 
scheme, elasticity of the beneficial use requirement, and the “use it or 
lose it” rule create powerful incentives for people to take their full wa-
ter claim and bypass investments in water conservation infrastruc-
ture.204 Additionally, the doctrine provides no incentives to make water 
use more efficient or environmentally friendly.205 
 Strict adherence to the rule of priority in the prior appropriation 
doctrine is economically irresponsible in times of water shortage.206 
When there is not enough water for everyone with claims, the rule re-
quires that water be apportioned according to the date of diversion.207 
Thus, in years when water flows are low, people holding junior water 
rights may receive no water.208 In contrast, people holding more senior 
water rights will consistently receive the full amount of their claim.209 
The uneven distribution of water allows senior diverters to continue 
inefficient uses at the expense of junior diverters with higher productiv-
ity or efficient uses.210 Essentially, the distribution of water under the 
                                                                                                                      
201 See infra notes 212–223 and accompanying text. 
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prior appropriation system involves no correlation between productiv-
ity and priority.211 
 Another problem with prior appropriation is that the beneficial 
use requirement allows the inefficient use of water by discouraging 
rights holders from altering their use from an outdated one to a more 
modern, efficient use.212 Though the beneficial use requirement was 
intended to prevent the squandering of water, the flexibility in what 
constitutes a “beneficial use” permits many practices that are not eco-
nomically efficient.213 Given the multiplicity of uses that qualify as bene-
ficial and the lack of a comprehensive definition, beneficial use can 
best be described as a threshold requirement that operates only as a 
backstop to the excessive taking of water.214 One author has even de-
scribed the requirement as “a fairly elastic concept that freezes old cus-
toms, [and] allows water users considerable flexibility in the amount 
and method of use.”215 Thus, although the beneficial use doctrine 
could be employed to limit inefficient uses of water, it has yet to serve 
that function.216 
 Like the beneficial use requirement, the “use it or lose it” prohibi-
tion against waste—also called forfeiture217—motivates diverters to take 
their whole water allotment from the river.218 People threatened with 
losing an unused water right are not likely to reduce their water use.219 
Water rights holders are discouraged from applying their water alloca-
tions to more efficient uses because they risk losing their water rights 
altogether should they use their water for uses other than those origi-
nally decreed.220 The prohibition incentives a diverter to hoard water 
and maximize diversions so long as the water is put to its originally de-
                                                                                                                      
211 See Carey & Sunding, supra note 210; Dellapenna, supra note 206. 
212 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n v. Simpson 990 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. 
1999); Tarlock, supra note 43, at 780. 
213 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (“It is implicit in these constitu-
tional provisions that, along with vested rights, there shall be maximum utilization of the wa-
ter of this state.”); Dunning, supra note 58, at 447; Neuman, supra note 55, at 947–48. 
214 See Douglas W. MacDougal, Private Hopes and Public Values in the “Reasonable Beneficial 
Use” of Hawai’i’s Water: Is Balance Possible?, 18 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1, 41 n.191 (1996) (describ-
ing how water must only be put to some beneficial use in order to fulfill the requirement, 
not necessarily the best or most efficient use); supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
215 Neuman, supra note 55, at 922. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. at 928 n.53. 
218 See Tarlock, supra note 63, at 901; Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transi-
tion, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 317, 344 (1985). 
219 See Tarlock, supra note 63, at 901; Wilkinson, supra note 218. 
220 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches, 990 P.2d at 49, 59. 
2013] Colorado Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine 285 
creed, plausibly beneficial use, regardless of its economic value.221 Fur-
thermore, by encouraging the use of a complete water allocation, the 
doctrine promotes the development of quick, and potentially unneces-
sary, water uses.222 The result is that the waste doctrine penalizes in-
creased efficiency in water use because any water not used is considered 
legally lost.223 
 The interplay between the Colorado-Big Thompson (“C-BT”) and 
Windy Gap Projects is a clear example of the negative effects the prior 
appropriation system has on economic efficiency and productivity.224 
The Windy Gap Project pushes C-BT Project rights holders to take as 
much water as possible without regard to the productivity or economic 
efficiency of the water use.225 Under prior appropriation’s strict rule of 
priority, the junior water rights of the Windy Gap communities have 
been regularly sacrificed for more senior downstream rights, regardless 
of the value or efficiency of the water’s use.226 Additionally, under the 
flexible beneficial use definition a significant amount of C-BT and 
Windy Gap Project water that does reach the communities can be used 
for landscaping and other non-essential uses.227 In fact, only thirty-five 
percent of C-BT and Windy Gap Project water currently used is dedi-
cated to municipal and industrial needs.228 Declining agricultural 
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needs in Front Range communities use the remaining sixty-five per-
cent.229 Furthermore, by threatening to take away any unused water, 
the rule against waste simply encourages the Front Range communities 
to continue these economically inefficient uses.230 
                                                                                                                     
2. Environmental Consequences and the Windy Gap Project 
 Increasing population growth in the West combined with strict 
prior appropriation rules have resulted in the diversion of larger 
amounts of water from key rivers and tributaries.231 This combination, 
in turn, causes devastating harm to ecosystems.232 Nevertheless, despite 
the resulting environmental impacts, the prior appropriation system 
does not require consideration of any environmental consequences 
prior to granting an appropriation.233 Thus, when the rights to the 
Windy Gap Project water were assigned to Northern Water under the 
prior appropriation system in the 1960s, the water court did not study 
the environmental consequences of such a water distribution system.234 
More than forty years later, however, the Bureau of Reclamation com-
pleted an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) detailing the impacts 
likely to result from the construction of a designated Windy Gap Reser-
voir.235 The Bureau of Reclamation examined impacts from both the 
reservoir’s construction and the corresponding continual loss of water 
from the Colorado River.236 
 The effects listed in the Windy Gap Reservoir EIS are typical ex-
amples of consequences that the taking of water through prior appro-
priation can have on aquatic and other environments.237 The EIS ex-
pected the extra diversion of water from the Colorado River due to the 
Firming Project would decrease the average annual downstream flow by 
up to fifteen percent.238 Scientific modeling showed that lower water 
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235 Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Windy Gap Firming Pro-
ject: Final Environmental Impact Statement (2011), available at http://www.usbr.gov/ 
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236 Id. at ES-1 to -26. 
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238 Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 235, at ES-11. 
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flows would likely cause the river temperature below the Windy Gap 
divergence to exceed the maximum weekly average temperature more 
frequently.239 Furthermore, the chemical composition of the water be-
low the divergence would likely change.240 All of these effects would 
likely combine to put significant stress on fish populations.241 Authori-
ties anticipate adult rainbow trout habitat in the upper Colorado River 
would decrease up to thirty-four percent in August, when expected 
demand for the Windy Gap Project water is greatest.242 The EIS also 
indicated potential harm to wetlands, wildlife and endangered species, 
and public recreation.243 
 Although Colorado’s recent change allowing minimum instream 
flows and instream diversions is well intentioned, it is not enough to 
mitigate the environmental consequences that would result from the 
Windy Gap Firming Project.244 Allowing instream flow requirements 
and diversions may have the effect of preserving natural flows for envi-
ronmental conservation, however, that is not their purpose.245 The excep-
tions to the strict prior appropriation doctrine do not result in signifi-
cant environmental protection.246 Not only are the instream flow rights 
junior to established water rights, but instream flow programs may only 
protect otherwise unappropriated flows.247 In other words, instream 
flow protections cannot actually change the water allocation in already 
over-appropriated waterways, such as those on which the Front Range 
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depends, and thus do nothing to prevent the dewatering of a river.248 
Further, technically instream flow rights may only be held by the Colo-
rado Water Conservation Board, severely limiting their usefulness.249 
                                                                                                                     
C. Changing Colorado Law: Using The Public Trust and Public Interest 
 The impact of the C-BT Project on the Windy Gap Project diver-
sion is a stark example of the economic inefficiency and environmental 
consequences that result from removing water from a river under the 
prior appropriation system.250 To avoid these devastating effects, Colo-
rado water law must recognize the effects of water scarcity on the envi-
ronment and the inefficiency in the current use of water.251 Moving 
forward, water rights should be determined after taking into account 
the efficiency and environmental concerns associated with particular 
water uses.252 To accomplish this, Colorado courts must incorporate the 
public interest and public trust doctrines into their jurisprudence.253 
 Some Colorado citizens proposed to fix the problems of the prior 
appropriation system by rejecting it in favor of a public trust.254 They 
proposed an initiative to amend the Colorado state constitution to cre-
ate public ownership of rivers and streams.255 The trust would have 
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instream as if they were a “diversion” in a traditional sense, thus essentially giving a private 
party an instream diversion right); Getches, supra note 184, at 32 (noting some exceptions 
to the state’s exclusive power over instream flows). 
250 See supra notes 225–249 and accompanying text. 
251 See All about Colorado Water 2012, Colo. Water 2012, http://water2012.org/about/ 
the-history-story-and-crew-of-colorado-water-2012.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (discuss-
ing how Colorado designated 2012 as “The Year of Water” due to increasing awareness 
about the importance and limited nature of the resource); supra notes 225–249 and ac-
companying text. 
252 See supra notes 225–249 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 266–309 and accompanying text. 
254 Sara Cothren McCleary, Referendum Will Affect Colorado Residents, The Mountain Mail 
(Salida, Colo.), Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.themountainmail.com/news/article_c3e2d 496- 
41f1-11e1-bd2d-0019bb30f31a.html; see Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5 (proposed initiative No. 3, 
Nov. 2011) (initiative to amend the Colorado Constitution) [hereinafter Proposed Initiative 
No. 3], available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/ 
2011-2012/3Final.pdf. 
255 Opening Brief of the Respondent Richard G. Hamilton at 9, Kemper v. Hamilton, 274 
P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012) (No. 12SA8), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/ 
Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/initiatives/2011_2012/12SA8/Hamilton%20Amended 
%20Opening.pdf; see Proposed Initiative No. 3, supra note 254; Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6 
(proposed initiative No. 45, Dec. 2011) (initiative to amend the Colorado Constitution), 
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provided significant environmental protection to water resources, and 
would “allow unfettered recreational access to streams.”256 The initia-
tive met significant, though not unexpected, opposition.257 The resis-
tance stemmed from the fact that public ownership of the water would 
be legally superior to any longstanding water rights.258 Thus, some crit-
ics argued, all current water rights in Colorado would have to go 
through an entirely new process to determine whether they meet the 
new criteria.259 Further, the lack of a means to transition equitably from 
the prior appropriation system to the proposed public trust was more 
likely to result in a prolonged administrative nightmare and significant 
entanglement of water rights than in proper environmental protec-
tion.260 The proposed initiative did not garner enough signatures to 
make it onto the ballot in November of 2012.261 
                                                                                                                     
 Instead of leaping to a public trust only system, Colorado’s end 
goal should be to create a model of law similar to California’s where the 
protective public trust is balanced against the vested rights of the prior 
appropriation system.262 The public trust doctrine includes, and is in-





256 See McCleary, supra note 254; supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (address-
ing the potential environmental benefits of a public trust). 
257 See Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 118 at 211–15; McCleary, supra note 254. See gen-
erally Opening Brief of the Respondent Richard G. Hamilton, supra note 255. 
258 Opening Brief of Petitioner Douglas Kemper at 2, 11, Kemper v. Hamilton, 274 P.3d 
562 (Colo. 2012) (No. 12SA22), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file 
/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/initiatives/2011_2012/12SA22/Kemper%20Opening 
%20Brief.pdf; see McCleary, supra note 254; Jason Mumm, Colorado’s Public Trust Initiatives, 
StepWise Util. Advisors ( Jan. 25, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.stepwiseadvisors.com/colo 
rados-public-trust-initiatives. 
259 See Opening Brief of Petitioner Douglas Kemper, supra note 258; McCleary, supra 
note 254; Mumm, supra note 258; see also Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 118, at 212–13. 
260 Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 118, at 212–13. 
261 Bob Berwyn, Colorado: Public Trust Initiatives on Water Law Fizzle, Vail Bus. J. ( July 
26, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.vailbusinessjournal.com/article.php?id=6987. 
262 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728, 732 (Cal. 
1983); Wilkinson, supra note 218, at 336 (“The recognition of the public trust doctrine in 
water law is the single strongest statement that historic uses must accommodate modern 
needs.”). 
263 Bokum, supra note 118, at 690–91 (“The public trust doctrine provides a basis for 
states’ authority over and responsibility for water resources; public welfare and public in-
terest are the broad terms for the values states seek to protect in exercising their responsi-
bility.”); Getches, supra note 184, at 34 (“The public trust doctrine is a forceful common 
law basis for infusing public interest concerns into water decisions.”); see Marks v. Whitney, 
491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (identifying the public trust as “sufficiently flexible to en-
compass changing public needs”); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho 1985) 
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that Colorado also explicitly identify public interest values to define the 
scope of the public trust.264 Thus, to create a legal model that balances 
existing rights with a public trust, Colorado must first adopt a statutory 
public interest system of water review that identifies clear public inter-
est values.265 
1. Public Interest Reform 
 The basic benefit of the public interest system, in contrast to the 
public trust, is that it explicitly identifies values that are important in 
the creation of water rights.266 As Colorado changes its views about wa-
ter from a use-centered model to one that recognizes water as a scarce 
resource, the malleability inherent in the public interest system will be 
advantageous.267 Though the values the public interest system protects 
may vary from state to state, the public interest approach enables legis-
latures to define economic efficiency and environmental protection 
variables that the prior appropriation system lacks.268 
 In New Mexico, the courts consistently identify particular public 
interest considerations when deciding whether an appropriation should 
move forward.269 Using the maximum utilization model to express un-
written public policy, New Mexico courts broadly construe such val-
ues.270 Thus, unlike Colorado, over the years New Mexico has been able 
to protect changing and elastic public values.271 
 Colorado should adopt a similar statutory body of public values to 
protect.272 Establishment of statutory public interest laws could fill the 
gaps in the prior appropriation system by modernizing the law to give 
                                                                                                                      
(noting that Idaho’s public interest requirement is “related to the larger doctrine of the 
public trust”). 
264 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Getches, supra note 184, at 
34. 
265 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Getches, supra note 184, at 
34. 
266 See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 189–198 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 202–249 and accompanying text. 
269 See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-5-7, 72-12-3(E) (2003); Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 
110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910) (identifying economic considerations); Grant, supra note 
81, at 499–500 (identifying cultural considerations). 
270 See Young & Norton, 110 P. at 1050; Grant, supra note 81, at 499–500. 
271 See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984) (noting that the 
public interest is “a broad term including health and safety, recreational, aesthetic, envi-
ronmental and economic interests”); Grant, supra note 81, at 490. 
272 See N.M. Stat Ann. §§ 72-5-7, 72-12-3(E); Young & Norton, 110 P. at 1050; Grant, su-
pra note 81, at 499–500. 
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new content to the beneficial use requirement.273 Historically, the pub-
lic’s interest was served by requiring that water be appropriated for a 
beneficial use.274 As noted above, however, application of an overly 
flexible beneficial use definition has allowed uses of water that are nei-
ther economical nor efficient.275 Unambiguously identifying and defin-
ing concrete values, like economic efficiency and environmental con-
servation, will provide the Colorado courts with an explicit set of values 
to protect.276 Thus, statutory public interest protections would function 
to promote values similar to those that were behind the creation of the 
beneficial use requirement, while constraining some of the flexibility 
that has undermined beneficial use in Colorado.277 
 Some Colorado courts have already specifically identified public 
interest values to be protected.278 Nevertheless, the lack of a compre-
hensive statutory body of public interest law means that no law requires 
the courts to review important public interest values, and therefore it is 
not uniformly performed.279 Creation of a comprehensive body of pub-
lic interest law would establish a base of “public uses” that could ulti-
mately be incorporated into a public trust to define its scope.280 
 Defining public interest values, such as economic efficiency and 
environmental protection, to fill the gaps in the prior appropriation 
system is likely to encourage implementation of these ideals among the 
                                                                                                                      
273 See Klein, supra note 53 (finding that “beneficial use has a flexible meaning, gener-
ally reflecting the dominant public interest of the time”); Adam Schempp, Envtl. Law 
Inst., Western Water in the 21st Century 7 (2009), available at http://www.elistore. 
org/Data/products/d19_02.pdf (arguing that by adding water conservation values to the 
definition of “beneficial use,” Colorado could discourage waste). 
274 Benson, supra note 76, at 1303 (suggesting that the lack of public interest law in 
Colorado is a result of the idea that “the public interest is best served by ensuring that 
water may be appropriated for beneficial use”); Hobbs & Raley, supra note 92 (suggesting 
that the Colorado courts’ application of the prior appropriation doctrine itself actually 
furthers the public interest). 
275 See supra notes 202–249 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 189–198 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-
401 (2003) (identifying groundwater protection as important); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 90.54.010 (2004) (identifying natural resources and public health as important). 
277 See Combs, 28 P. at 967–68 (Colo. 1892) (noting that the beneficial use requirement 
was intended to discourage water speculation and encourage quick use of water resources); 
Klein, supra note 53; Schempp, supra note 273; supra notes 212–216 and accompanying text. 
278 Wadsworth v. Kuiper, 562 P.2d 1114, 1116–17 (Colo. 1977) (finding that the Colo-
rado Constitution implies “a vital interest in preserving the water resources of the state” 
and “mandates the protection of the public interest in water”); Hobbs & Raley, supra note 
92 (suggesting that the Colorado courts’ application of the prior appropriation doctrine 
itself actually furthers the public interest). 
279 Abeln, supra note 14, at 536–38. 
280 See Bokum, supra note 118, at 690–91; Getches, supra note 184, at 34. 
292 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:259 
Windy Gap communities.281 If, after conducting a public interest re-
view, a court finds that the communities’ water use would not meet the 
designated public interests, the communities would be required to 
come into compliance prior to gaining additional water rights associ-
ated with the Windy Gap Firming Project.282 In contrast, if a court finds 
that the Front Range communities’ need for water outweighs other de-
fined considerations, the public interest review would, at the least, draw 
attention to the issues at hand and likely would encourage, though not 
mandate, economically efficient and environmentally friendly uses.283 
 Public interest review, however, is not ideal in the long run. The 
temporal and geographic flexibility inherent in the public interest sys-
tem is likely to create insecurity and uncertainty in the granting of wa-
ter rights.284 Further, should Colorado adopt the “other laws” model of 
public interest review, which requires an agency to take into account 
explicit constitutional policies when deciding whether to allow an ap-
propriation, the outcome would likely mimic the economic-centered 
focus of Colorado’s current statutory prior appropriation system.285 
The public interest system’s inherent flexibility suggests that statutorily 
required public interest review should be a step toward the solution to 
Colorado’s water law problem, but not the final answer.286 
2. Adopting the California Public Trust Model 
 Colorado should achieve a system of water rights similar to Cali-
fornia’s, where the court balances the public trust against vested water 
rights.287 California’s model is the prime example of both the widening 
of the public trust through public interest considerations and the inte-
gration of the trust with vested water rights.288 Adoption of a similar 
model in Colorado could incorporate public interest values such as 
                                                                                                                      
281 See Abeln, supra note 14, at 533; Grant, supra note 81, 490; supra notes 85–115 and 
accompanying text. 
282 See Abeln, supra note 14, at 533; Grant, supra note 81, 490; supra notes 85–115 and 
accompanying text. 
283 See Abeln, supra note 14, at 533; Grant, supra note 81, at 486, 490; supra notes 85–
115 and accompanying text. 
284 See Grant, supra note 81, at 491; supra notes 104–115 and accompanying text. 
285 See Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6; Grant, supra note 81, at 489. 
286 See Grant, supra note 81, at 489–91. 
287 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728. 
288 See id.; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595–
600 (Ct. App. 2008); Rieser, supra note 129, at 393–94. 
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economic efficiency and environmental protection, without having to 
completely overhaul Colorado’s prior appropriation system.289 
 The public trust is informed by and incorporates public interest 
values, but also avoids the inherent uncertainty and flexibility of a tradi-
tional public interest system.290 For example, in California, the courts 
recognized an ecological public trust by identifying and incorporating 
public interest values centered around preservation.291 In contrast, 
Colorado’s strict adherence to the prior appropriation system has pre-
vented Colorado water law from adapting similarly to the social and 
economic changes over the past century.292 To do so, Colorado would 
have to incorporate newfound statutory public interest values into a 
public trust.293 As noted above, in the case of the Windy Gap water, such 
values could include efficient use of the water and environmental pro-
tection.294 Incorporation of these values would curtail non-efficient uses 
of water, such as landscaping, and would help protect against the devas-
tating environmental effects detailed in the Windy Gap Firming Project 
EIS.295 Furthermore, explicitly identifying these values and incorporat-
ing them into the trust would clearly define the trust’s scope.296 
 One of the primary benefits of California’s public trust model is 
that it balances vested prior appropriation rights against the trust’s pub-
lic interest values when the two systems conflict.297 As the Mono Lake de-
cision emphasized, the public trust doctrine should be considered 
alongside other water rights systems.298 In Mono Lake, the court recog-
nized the importance of Los Angeles’s vested water rights and balanced 
those concerns against the dramatic environmental consequences of 
                                                                                                                      
289 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728; infra notes 290–296 and accompanying text. 
290 Bokum, supra note 118, at 690–91; Getches, supra note 184, at 34; see Grant, supra 
note 81, at 491; supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text (noting that the state must 
preserve the public trust for the benefit of all the state’s people, both present and future); 
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introduced by geographic and temporal problems in the public interest doctrine). 
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and accompanying text. 
296 See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380; Bokum, supra note 118, at 690–91; Getches, supra note 
184, at 34. 
297 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728, 732; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91. 
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taking water out of Mono Lake.299 Nevertheless, the court ultimately 
refused to dictate a decision on the water allocation, only requiring re-
consideration of the diversions from Mono Lake in light of the public 
trust purposes.300 The court’s action implies significant protection for 
vested rights, subordinating to the public trust only so long as the vested 
rights are imminently injurious to the trust res (i.e., public interest val-
ues).
ange their water uses to accommo-
ate
such a new legal system is likely to promote the economically efficient 
                                                                                                                     
301 
 In the case of the contested diversions, application of public trust 
protections would integrate public interest considerations while also 
generally protecting vested prior appropriation rights.302 In circum-
stances like the Windy Gap Firming Project, where the public trust’s 
environmental and economic efficiency protections would directly con-
flict with vested rights, the court must balance the competing inter-
ests.303 The public trust’s protections may prevail only to the extent 
necessary to protect specific public interest considerations.304 Thus, like 
in Mono Lake, the Windy Gap communities that have vested rights in 
the water may have to curtail and ch
d  the public interest concerns.305 
 The integration of public interest concerns into Colorado water law 
may also require downstream users to curtail or change their water use 
to accomplish fully the public interest goals.306 This would result in 
communities across the Southwest shouldering together the responsibil-
ity for dealing with water shortages.307 In contrast, should a court find 
instead that the public trust protections win out fully over the communi-
ties’ vested rights, the result would encourage Front Range communities 
to devise other innovative ways of acquiring and using water.308 Thus, 
 
299 Id. at 714–16, 727–28. 
300 Id. at 732. 
301 See id. at 728, 732; see also El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91, 495–96. Some com-
mentators argue that limiting or taking vested water rights through implementation of a 
public trust would constitute a taking and thus require just compensation. Leonhardt & 
Waite, supra note 118, at 209–11. Such an argument, however, is not truly a negative be-
cause although it could subject the state to significant monetary liability, it would also cur-
tail use of the public trust in inappropriate situations. See id. 
302 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728, 732; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91; Bokum, 
supra note 118, at 690–91; Getches, supra note 184, at 34. 
303 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728, 732; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91, 495–96. 
304 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728, 732; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490–91, 495–96. 
305 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29. 
306 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491 & n.21. 
307 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491 & n.21. 
308 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491 & n.21. 
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use of current water resources while simultaneously protecting the 
Colorado River environment.309 
Conclusion 
 Water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource in the Desert 
West. Some communities have tackled this problem by filing for more 
water rights from the Colorado River. However, under Colorado’s cur-
rent water law system, rights are granted without concern for the effi-
ciency of the use of water or the dramatic environmental consequences 
of the taking. Creating a statutory public interest system of water law in 
Colorado would identify explicit values that Colorado wishes to protect. 
In Colorado, these values ought to include economic efficiency and 
environmental protection. In the short run integration of such protec-
tive values in central Colorado would likely prevent the creation of a 
designated Windy Gap Reservoir due to the projected environmental 
effects of the project, possibly also causing water shortage issues. How-
ever, long-term implementation of the values would ultimately result in 
more water available to the junior water rights holders. Thus, integrat-
ing these values into the protective nature of the public trust will pro-
vide environmental and economic benefits to the public over the long-
term. Furthermore, vested prior appropriation rights will remain un-
touched so long as they do not directly harm the public trust protec-
tions. 
 
309 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29; El Dorado, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491 & n.21; Bokum, 
supra note 118, at 690–91; Getches, supra note 184, at 34; supra notes 287–308 and accom-
panying text. 
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